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Introduction 
After the Second World War, European historians of fascist 
phenomena mainly focused on Italian Fascism and German Nazism, and 
justly so. In the last two decades, however, an increasing number of studies 
have been dedicated to various manifestations of fascism in Eastern 
European countries. These have only occasionally included the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia. It was mainly due to the Croatian Ustaša movement 
that Yugoslavia received notice. To date, several monographs have 
appeared on the Ustaša. They have also covered various aspects of the so-
called Independent State of Croatia. Interest in fascism and radical 
nationalism on Yugoslav territory grew after the inter-ethnic wars of the 
1990s (Hory and Broszat 1964, Scotti 1976, MacDonald 2002). In the 
collection on fascism in Europe edited by S. J. Wolf in 1968, Yugoslavia 
was not mentioned at all, whereas P. F. Sugar’s collection three years later 
contained two papers on fascism in Yugoslavia (Wolf 1968, Sugar 1971). 
While some studies of fascism mention only the Ustaša movement, the most 
recent one by Sabrina P. Ramet, briefly present the emergence of fascist 
movements in other Yugoslav nations, cursorily treating the Slovenes as 
well (2006: 35–111). A number of otherwise excellent recent studies on 
Yugoslavia or the Balkans after 1930 (Cox 2007, Tomasevich 2001) 
concentrate on the Ustaša movement or its leader, Ante Pavelić. This holds 
true as well for the collection of scholarly papers about the Independent 
State of Croatia edited by Sabrina Ramet (2007).  
The fact that, with the exception of the Ustaša movement, pre-WW 
II fascism on Yugoslav territory generated so little interest suggests that it 
was insignificant, exerting no major influence on the political and social 
processes in pre-war Yugoslavia. Due to the size of the country, perhaps, 
Slovene fascism or fascism in Slovenia have received scant notice. In this 
article I will attempt to fill the gap I am alluding to by providing an 
overview of political movements with certain fascist characteristics. This 
article is based primarily on published scholarship and recorded 
reminiscences, and only partly on archival resources. The latter—at least 
those found in the Slovene and Belgrade archives—have been consulted in 
the aforementioned studies. However, historians have yet to carry out an 
in-depth exploration of this issue and examine the resources from the 
archives of the police and administrative bodies of that time in Belgrade as 
well as in Rome.   
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On entering the new Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, the Slovenes, and especially its political elite, found 
themselves in a completely new cultural and political environment. Slovene 
politicians were compelled to seek different approaches, operational tactics, 
and new associations. The new European context, resulting from the Peace 
of Versailles and, above all, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, presented 
radical challenges and posed many strategic political and ideological issues. 
While the situation of the Slovenes, at least those living in the Yugoslav 
state, had improved in many ways since before the First World War,1 it did 
not inspire much optimism strategically: disenchantment with the Yugoslav 
centralist system made aspirations for territorial, political, and even cultural 
autonomy the main topic in Slovene politics over the subsequent two 
decades. As a result of the post-war border demarcation, a significant 
proportion of the already small Slovene nation was living in neighboring 
states, especially Italy, where it was subjected to accelerated assimilation 
under the emerging fascist regime. Considering the worsening social 
situation, the recurring workers’ protests, and the suppression of the 
revolutionary Communist Party, it comes as no surprise that Slovene 
politics were marked by constant tension and dissatisfaction. The Catholic-
oriented Slovene People’s Party retained political dominance in the new 
state, winning the majority of votes—usually absolute—in all elections. The 
liberal and socialist camps started seeking new ways of operating, giving 
rise to and also witnessing the demise of new parties and political 
movements. There were also some individual initiatives. While the Slovene 
People’s Party essentially stood for limited autonomy for Slovenia, the 
liberal groups, in their defiance of clericalism, advocated centralism and 
even so-called integral Yugoslavism, thus calling into question the very 
existence of the Slovene people by claiming they were just part of a greater 
Yugoslav nation. In this tactical game that lasted throughout the first 
Yugoslavia, the liberals entered into various associations with Belgrade, 
where Serbian political parties held power at the time.  
 
Meeting Hitler 
 An interesting phenomenon in the context of this discussion is the 
emergence of the Slovene National Socialist Party, which evolved from a 
liberal trade union movement in 1919 and was founded by dissidents from 
the Liberal and the Social Democratic Parties. Its program promoted the 
idea of “an original Yugoslav socialist system in which wealth would be the 
                                            
1  Meaning especially the fact that the Slovenes were relieved of German-
Austrian nationalist pressure, and thus further Germanization in Lower Styria 
was prevented. In the new state, Slovenes could, among other things, fully 
develop their culture and scholarship, which also manifested itself symbolically 
in the establishment of the Slovene University in Ljubljana.  
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property of all who created it” (Perovšek 1994: 166). Despite an overtly 
socialist rhetoric, the party that had won two mandates in the first Yugoslav 
parliamentary elections returned to the liberal camp and, in 1928, merged 
with the Slovene faction of the Independent Democratic Party. Its name was 
a matter of some intrigue due to its similarity with the German National 
Socialist Workers’ Party. This led some contemporaries and subsequent 
historiographers to draw uncritical comparisons and unjustly attach “Nazi” 
attributes to this Slovene party (Mikuž 1965: 108–12).  
What must have contributed to this view was an interesting episode 
from 1921, when Branimir Kozinc, one of the leaders of the Slovene 
National Socialist Party, attended an international congress of socialist 
parties in Salzburg. Hitler’s party wanted to attend the congress, too, but 
was not admitted. After the congress, Kozinc made a visit to Munich where 
he noticed placards for a rally in a tavern, with Adolf Hitler as a speaker, 
and decided it was worth seeing. In the crowded tavern, he was immediately 
struck by Hitler’s choleric and fanatical delivery. Afterwards, one of the 
organizers who had learned that Kozinc was a delegate of a Yugoslav 
political party and had just attended the congress in Salzburg, invited him to 
meet with Hitler. The future führer gave him a warm welcome and 
proposed the establishment of closer links between their two parties. Kozinc 
responded that, unfortunately, this was impossible. When asked for the 
reason, he explained: “You accept money from capitalists, even from the 
Jewish ones, against whom you speak. What kind of socialist party is yours 
then?” (Perovšek 1997: 270). Hitler justified this attitude by saying that 
there was no room for morals in politics. Kozinc disagreed. This was 
followed by some polite phrases, with Hitler praising the natural beauty of 
Yugoslavia, and Kozinc inviting him to see it for himself. Before parting, 
they wished success to their respective parties. This chance meeting in no 
way influenced the future of either party. The paths of these two men were 
as different as their “successes.” Nevertheless, this meeting is recorded as 
one of the very few, if not the only, personal meetings of a Slovene with 
Hitler. 
 
ORJUN A 
 The early 1920s saw the emergence of ORJUNA (Organization of 
Yugoslav Nationalists). At the time it was the only organization with some 
attributes of a fascist movement. Founded in March 1921 in the Dalmatian 
city of Split as the Yugoslav Progressive Nationalist Youth, it continued the 
tradition of similar associations from before the First World War, which 
fought against the Austro-Hungarian regime. The fact that the organization 
was founded in Dalmatia, near the Italian border, was no mere coincidence, 
given that its first members included many émigrés from Italian occupied 
territory. Therefore, the first objective of its founders was the struggle 
BORIS MLAKAR 
 
4 
against the Italian occupation of Slovene and Croat lands and their eventual 
liberation. Over the following two years, the majority of ORJUNA 
members who were émigrés primarily engaged in operations against the 
Italian regime, on both Yugoslav and Italian territories.  
Before 1928, ORJUNA members, individually or in groups, often 
engaged in sabotage and armed attacks against the Italian fascist 
institutions, military strongholds, and Slovene collaborators on the Italian 
side of the border. Italian and Yugoslav authorities recorded scores of such 
violent operations along the border carried out by armed ORJUNA 
members, many of whom were later tried in one country or the other (Melik 
1989). During demarcation negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia, 
ORJUNA organized demonstrations in front of the Italian consulate in 
Ljubljana. In 1923, it staged an armed occupation of the peak of Triglav, the 
highest Slovene mountain and a national emblem, symbolically claiming it 
for Yugoslavia in defiance of Italian plans to shift the border onto the 
strategically important point (Kacin-Wohinz 1990: 49–51). However, by the 
end of the 1920s in Italy, ORJUNA had lost its leading role in the struggle 
against the Italian occupation. This was in part due to its excessively violent 
methods and, above all, the change in attitude towards the organization in 
Yugoslavia. Although the organization called TIGR (after Trieste, Istria, 
Gorizia, and Rijeka) replaced ORJUNA as leader of the resistance 
movement, the Italian consulate in Ljubljana continued closely to monitor 
members of the by then dissolved and clandestine ORJUNA (Archivio 
Centrale).  
 Because it opposed Italian fascism for patriotic reasons, it could be 
concluded that ORJUNA had nothing in common with it. This impression 
changes, however, when ORJUNA operations in Slovenia and Yugoslavia 
are closely examined. According to some observers, fascist groups in Italy 
inspired the founding of ORJUNA. This was supposedly evident from its 
methods of operation, and, even more, its statutes. Particularly revealing in 
this respect was article 2, which stipulated that the organization’s program 
was to be implemented not only through moral and intellectual force but, “if 
necessary, also through the physical force by its members” (Statut in 
program 1923: 3; Perovšek 1998: 49–51). The program further envisioned 
drastic action against anyone threatening the unity of the Yugoslav nation or 
state, opposition to all forms of separatism, whether tribal or religious, and 
participation in the “building of a unique Yugoslav racial type and a 
distinctive Yugoslav nation.” In view of the provision justifying the use of 
violence, the authorities in Slovenia were reluctant to register the 
organization officially. Although ORJUNA’s statutes were soon approved 
in other parts of Yugoslavia, Ivan Hribar, the provincial governor of 
Slovenia, saw a similarity between ORJUNA and Mussolini’s movement 
and refused to follow suit. He eventually had to yield under the pressure 
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from high-ranking state officials and physical threats from ORJUNA 
members (Hribar 1928: 510–13). 
 ORJUNA was directed by a central committee located in Split. 
Within this committee, there was a narrower directorate that handled the 
actual leadership of the organization and public relations. It was headed by 
Dr. Ljubo Leontić. ORJUNA was represented in individual regions by 
provincial (oblast) committees and, in the areas with a larger membership, 
town committees. Occasional provincial assemblies were also important 
institutions. ORJUNA was strongest in Dalmatia and gradually spread to 
other Yugoslav provinces, seemingly finding the most fertile ground in 
Slovenia, where its first homonymous bulletin began to be issued at the 
beginning of 1923. Before long, ORJUNA committees were set up in some 
twenty Slovene urban centers, allowing for a provincial assembly at the end 
of March 1923 (Bartulović 1925: 80–126). On that occasion, Marko 
Kranjec (1885–1973) was elected president of Slovene ORJUNA. Kranjec 
was, by all measures, a curious personality. During the First World War, 
while on the Tyrolean front, he defected from the Austro-Hungarian army 
to join the ranks of Yugoslav volunteers fighting against Austria. After the 
occupation of the Slovene littoral by the Italians, he emigrated to 
Yugoslavia. Being a fervent supporter of integral Yugoslav nationalism, one 
of his first moves there was to convert from Roman Catholicism to 
Orthodoxy and change his name from Ferdo to Marko. This was an obvious 
allusion to Prince Marko, a medieval Serbian hero. He was also imprisoned 
for his ORJUNA activities and after the organization’s decline moved, or 
rather was deported to Skopje in Macedonia. 
 ORJUNA placed great emphasis on discipline. At its first congress, 
in Split, it adopted a proposal to “introduce army-like iron discipline,” 
which was to be implemented, together with uniformity, “to the extreme” 
throughout the organization. Its members were formed in a belligerent spirit 
bordering on fanaticism and were expected to give their lives for their ideas. 
Far from renouncing violence, the organization supported the use of violent 
means. For a more effective execution of operations, so-called action 
detachments were formed, which were armed when required. Initially, these 
detachments were directed by Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, a Chetnik duke, 
whom Kranjec later replaced (Gligorijević 1975). 
ORJUNA enjoyed strong support from the centrist-oriented 
Independent Democratic Party and in particular from its leader, Svetozar 
Pribičević. Because of that, some contemporaries believed that he was 
actually ORJUNA’s founder, which was not the case, at least not formally 
(Matković 1972: 127–35). ORJUNA, in turn, made no attempt to hide its 
sympathies for the party, supporting it in all elections. In spite of 
suggestions that ORJUNA should declare itself an independent political 
force, a political party, the organization was not entirely independent and 
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therefore not quite comparable with other fascist movements in Europe. It 
fanatically promoted the concept of integral nationalism (i.e., the idea of a 
single Yugoslav nation), employing revolutionary phraseology in the 
process, declaring that a revolution would be carried out in the country, 
followed by a dictatorship by the nationalists. Such rhetoric was 
diametrically opposite to that of the communists, whom it branded as its 
primary adversaries and enemies of the state. 
Apart from the émigrés, the majority of ORJUNA members, who 
called themselves “brothers,” had come from gymnastic societies, such as 
Sokol (Falcon). By profession, they were craftsmen, lower-ranking 
bureaucrats, and also the so-called lumpenproletariat. Among the members 
were some prominent public figures, most notably Vladimir Levstik. 
Sympathizers included Alojz Gradnik, a writer, and Fran Šuklje, an old 
Slovene politician, who also showed some interest in Italian fascism. Some 
people also associated Vladimir Bartol with ORJUNA. Bartol described a 
version of totalitarian society in his famous novel, Alamut, set in Persia 
(Šuklje 1933: 259–61; Legiša 1976: 244). The organization had a number of 
sympathizers among the students of Ljubljana University, who founded the 
ORJUNA Academic Club in early 1924. However, due to their violent 
behavior toward other groups, ORJUNA students failed to secure much 
support among their fellows (Kremenšek 1972: 98). Some attempts were 
also made to found a workers’ ORJUNA, with the aim of restraining the 
influence of communists and socialists among the proletariat. ORJUNA 
received, and sometimes forced, financial support from liberally oriented 
capitalists. In order to secure financial independence, the organization even 
attempted to receive credit from a commercial and industrial cooperative, 
using the name Economic ORJUNA, though this never materialized (Šuštar 
1990: 144–46).  
  Apart from communists, the Slovene ORJUNA declared 
clericalists, ethnic minorities, and also Jews as enemies of Yugoslav unity. 
While anti-Semitism was certainly present in its ideology, it remained 
propaganda; its members never physically attacked Jews. This was not so 
when it came to other adversaries. As a result, the Slovene public soon 
perceived ORJUNA as a terrorist organization. Its members, for example, 
attacked German minority cultural institutions and public gatherings in the 
north-eastern towns of Slovenia (Šuštar 1990). ORJUNA organized various 
demonstrations, such as banner-raisings, using provocative slogans and 
verbally abusing the people. They demolished a Catholic printing works in 
Maribor, and in Ljubljana they attempted to disrupt a rally organized by 
Anton Korošec, the leader of the Slovene People’s Party (Friš 2004). One 
year later, in Ljubljana, there was an armed clash between ORJUNA 
members and the police, who would not let them march through to the city 
center. The most notorious instance of violence was their confrontation with 
workers in the mining town of Trbovlje on 1 June 1924. The town was a 
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communist stronghold, and ORJUNA members wanted to display their 
banner conspicuously. However, upon entering the town they were attacked 
by armed Proletarian Action Detachments the communists had deployed. 
Shooting ensued, leaving several dead on both sides. With the help of the 
police, ORJUNA members succeeded in entering the town, where they 
killed one of the captured workers. After their return to Ljubljana, they 
arranged a monumental funeral for those who had fallen in Trbovlje. 
Among the speakers was the writer Levstik, who began his panegyric, “O 
heroes! Silently and proudly you lie here before us as the first of the 
Slovene ORJUNAS who received the sacrament of chivalric death while 
defending our banner, for the glory and prosperity of our nation and the 
victory of our immortal idea.” To this, he added “Your blood, o brothers, 
cries to heaven!” (Grdina  1995: 280–81). Because of this and other, similar 
incidents, ORJUNA started losing its influence and reputation. It was 
abolished in Slovenia two years later and disarmed in other parts of 
Yugoslavia (Perovšek 1996: 255–58; Klopčič 1977: 409–18; Marinko 1971: 
44–52; Klavora 1966: 321). In 1929, ORJUNA was outlawed, along with 
all political parties and organizations, after the proclamation of King 
Alexandar’s personal dictatorship. Several attempts to revive ORJUNA 
were made after 1931, by Kranjec in particular; however, they were to no 
avail. By that time the political arena had come to be dominated by other 
such organizations (Gligorijević 1963: 389–91; Čop 2006). 
 
Slovenes in Italy 
 After the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, Italy occupied the 
Slovene littoral and Istria, claiming the reward promised in the 1915 Treaty 
of London for having enteried the war on the side of the Entente forces. The 
region was densely populated with Slovenes and Croatians. As a result, 
several hundred thousand Slovenes from the hinterland of Trieste and 
Gorizia came under Italy and were subjected to forced Italianization even 
before fascism had been officially established. In the beginning, the Italian 
authorities used refined and less violent methods to win over the non-Italian 
population. These included the setting up of the so-called fascios in the 
Slovene countryside. The idea was that by joining locals would publicly 
show their loyalty to Italy and its regime and draw closer to its culture, 
including psychologically. The Italian regime’s goal was to break the unity 
of the Slovene political parties and deprive them of their argument that they 
represented the Slovene population (Kacin-Wohinz 1977: 258–59). In some 
areas, especially those bordering the Italian settlements, Slovene 
membership in these fascios increased, mostly on account of opportunist 
motives. In November 1922, the Italian authorities in Gorizia founded the 
Slovene Governmental Party, which stood for the merging of the Slovene 
and Italian populations, with the Slovenes preserving their language. 
Although the party published the bulletin Nova doba (The new age), it 
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completely failed in the elections. The party essentially served for the 
disruption of the Slovene and communist electoral rallies (Svoljšak 1997: 
278). As time passed, the fascist regime allowed fewer possibilities for the 
expression of Slovene identity. This led to the abolition of the Slovene 
Governmental Party in 1925, with its most fervent members joining the 
Italian Fascist Party (Sedmak 1979). 
 
Royal Dictatorship and the Regime of Milan Stojadinović 
 The unresolved national question in Yugoslavia was a growing 
problem and a source of dispute, especially between the Serbian and 
Croatian political elites. Cultural and religious differences between 
individual nations and provinces were substantial. King Alexandar 
Karadjordjević, who had even considered severing non-Serbian areas from 
Yugoslavia, was enraged by the killing of Croatian leader Stjepan Radić in 
the National Assembly. He carried out a coup d'état soon afterwards, 
dissolved the parliament, and renamed the country the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, which was to be populated by a single Yugoslav nation. All 
political parties were abolished or banned. Two years later, after imposing 
his own constitution, only pan-Yugoslav parties were allowed, and no 
ethnic or tribal parties, as he termed them. After his assassination by the 
Ustaša in Marseilles in 1934, the situation in Yugoslavia changed radically.2  
The 1935 and 1938 elections failed to resolve the country’s 
fundamental problems. Alexandar’s prime minister, General Petar Živković, 
and his successor, Milan Stojadinović, both ruled by combining populism 
and a hard line approach. Authoritarianism and the exaltation of the masses 
became fashionable in mainstream politics, with politicians dedicating 
particular attention to them in public. Intentionally or unintentionally, 
fascist models were adopted at political rallies in Yugoslavia, which became 
increasingly ideological and rich in iconography, including military 
insignia. Uniformed militia members trooped in straight lines under 
grandstands where sat politicians, and at rallies organized by Stojadinović 
exclamations like ”Leader, leader!” were heard. Paramilitary formations of 
village and city guards—or the so-called Slovene Boys, dressed in green or 
blue shirts—were a common occurrence around the country (Stojadinović 
1970: 533). Political opponents naturally did not miss an opportunity to 
brand this as fascism. Marxist writers easily labelled bourgeois politicians 
as fascists. They viewed Alexandar’s dictatorship as monarchic fascism, the 
regime of General Živković as Yugoslav fascism, and the dominance of the 
Slovene People’s Party under the leadership of Anton Korošec as clerical 
fascism. However, a realistic comparison with the regimes and the situation 
in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany shows that this was pure exaggeration. 
                                            
2  For more information about King Alexandar, see Farley (2007: 51–86).  
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New Movements 
Although the dictatorship outlawed regular political party activity, 
it was still possible to express political views in newspapers and journals. In 
the early 1930s, like-minded groups established several publications that 
gradually grew into political quasi-movements. Some of them were fully 
independent, while others were influenced by well-established, initially 
underground political groups. The majority of these movements supported 
the royal dictator and his idea of a single Yugoslav nation. In some 
ideological respects they came close to fascism. 
The first movement had developed from the former League of 
Combatants (Zveza bojevnikov), which was an association of WW I 
veterans, Chetniks and reserve officers. In 1934, the league was reformed as 
the Association of the Combatants of Yugoslavia or Boj (Battle). Its bulletin 
was symbolically named Prelom (The break). The association defined itself 
as a “non-partisan movement for the spiritual and physical preparation of 
national and state defense and for the promotion of the universal progress of 
our entire nation,” adding that its members were “soldiers in civilian 
clothes, standing by their king, on the basis of his Sixth of January 
Manifesto” (Mikuž 1965: 428). Boj fanatically upheld the king’s 
dictatorship, presenting it as a herald of a new era, a new Yugoslavia, 
national renaissance, and of order, justice, and uprightness. Consequently, it 
stressed the importance of morality, the ethnic and spiritual congeniality of 
the Yugoslav community, and strove for a planned economy and a 
corporatist social order. The association organized mass rallies throughout 
Slovenia, which were guarded by uniformed stewards. Because of this, its 
opponents soon designated the movement as fascist. One part of its 
leadership resented the designation, arguing that in order to deal with 
difficult economic and social issues, corresponding methods had to be 
applied (Gligorijević 1965: 59–61). When, at a certain point, the movement 
became relatively popular, mainstream political considerations started to 
enter, which weakened it. Infighting slowly eroded the movement and it 
split in 1935. One part returned to the old League of Combatants and started 
cooperating with the left wing, while the majority, led by Avgust Kuster, 
joined the newly founded pan-Yugoslav movement called Zbor (Gathering). 
According to former Communist Party activists’ memoirs, communist 
infiltration played a part in this (Kreft 1954: 38–40; Mlakar 1982: 158–59). 
A similar movement was founded in Maribor, around the bulletin 
Borba (Struggle), without, however, achieving the same kind of response as 
Boj enjoyed. The bulletin promoted such ideas as the transformation of the 
capitalist economy into a national-socialist economy, and wage 
relationships into co-ownership. Its readers and opponents were shocked 
when, in an article about the relationship between Yugoslavia and 
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Hitlerism, they read that from a domestic viewpoint what went on in 
Germany was irrelevant, and that what mattered was that Hitlerism had 
triumphed over communism and hurt the clericalists. The bulletin also 
claimed that the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak borders were safe because the 
Nazis ruled in Germany. It further expressed admiration for economic 
development in Germany.  
In the Yugoslav framework, Borba joined Yugoslav Action, which 
was founded in 1932 in Zagreb. According to its program, no political 
parties were needed in Yugoslavia, nor was a Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin 
necessary, since the country already had Alexandar. Borba promoted Marko 
Kranjc, the former ORJUNA leader, who was even elected to the central 
committee of Yugoslav Action. As early as mid-1935, however, Borba 
closed and the movement died away (Mikuž 1965: 426–27). In those years, 
another bulletin, Pohod (March), appeared. A small but extremely 
nationalistic movement developed around it. The group joined the better 
known pan-Yugoslav movement, Narodna odbrana (National defense). Its 
aim was the development of uniform Yugoslav politics under the slogans 
“with the nation for the nation” and “for Greater Yugoslavia, from Triglav 
to the Black Sea.” Pohod and the Narodna odbrana were both abolished by 
the authorities at the end of 1937 (Borak, Čepič, and Fischer 2005: 351). 
 
Zbor 
At the same time, in the mid-1930s, another fascist leaning 
movement emerged in Slovenia—namely, the Yugoslav National 
Movement Zbor, whose ideology and activities were closely associated with 
the name of its founder and leader Dimitrije Ljotić. Zbor was founded 
between the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935 in a merger of several 
movements and associations, among them Yugoslav Action and a part of 
the Slovene Boj movement. Ljotić was a Serbian lawyer who, during his 
studies in France, was attracted to Charles Maurras’s rejection of the French 
revolution, democracy, and individualism (Cohen 1996: 13–15). After 
returning to Serbia, he entered politics and promoted increasingly 
conservative ideas. Referencing religious beliefs, he emphasized the 
importance of cooperatives as a genuine Slavic mode of production and 
expressed disgust with parliamentary democracy and democracy in general. 
He attacked the Jews, who, in his view, “were served by the anti-national 
systems of capitalism, democracy, individualism, and atheism.” While 
acknowledging certain similarities between his ideology and fascism, he 
also stressed the differences, such as the fact that Zbor’s ideology was not 
based on race or state, although Ljotić stood for a planned economy and the 
building of a corporative state.  
There were also Slovenes among the Zbor members; for instance, 
Fran Kandare, who was part of the top leadership, and the well-known 
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Danilo Gregorič, who lived in Belgrade and was fully accustomed to the 
Serbian environment. The latter became the Zbor youth leader as well as 
head of its propaganda department. His moment of glory came during the 
war with his book Samoubistvo Jugoslavije (The suicide of Yugoslavia), 
published in Belgrade and subsequently reprinted several times, including 
in Nazi Germany (Gregorić 1943). In Slovenia, a provincial committee of 
Zbor was founded under the leadership of Artur Šturm. In 1936, the 
Slovene Zbor began publishing a bulletin by the same name. The 
movement’s central bulletin, published in Belgrade, was called Otadžbina 
(Fatherland). Zbor started promoting its ideas through numerous lectures 
given by Slovene sympathizers, who included many intellectuals. Its 
members and sympathizers were mostly workers, peasants, and bureaucrats. 
Occasionally Ljotić himself held rallies in Slovenia, giving anti-communist 
and anti-liberal speeches colored with his own mysticism. Very typical was 
his rhetorical question: “Do you know, comrades, why we are against 
liberal democracy and parliamentarism? Simply, because they contain the 
seeds of disorder and irresponsibility” (Ljotić  1938: 30). Zbor enjoyed 
some support among the academic youth. An academic sub-committee was 
founded and student sympathizers gathered in the club Edinstvo (Unity) 
(Miklavčič 1994: 234–42). Zbor’s influence reached into high schools as 
well, including the Celje gymnasium. The movement’s leader in Celje was 
Izidor Cergol, who revived the Zbor bulletin in 1939, although it was soon 
after banned again.  
Even though he had personal relations with all of them and was 
considered part of the Serbian political establishment, Ljotić often had 
serious disagreements with leading Yugoslav politicians due to his 
extremist views. Although the authorities would not let him transform his 
movement into a political party, he was allowed to run with his list in the 
1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections; however, he had no success. In the 
first elections, his list won 2,503 votes in the Drava Province and, in the 
second, as few as 1,132, far below the mark required for a seat in parliament 
(1984: 41–47). In the Yugoslav political arena, Ljotić became increasingly 
notorious for his open displays of sympathy for Nazi Germany, especially 
after the discovery that he received Nazi funding. This was revealed in the 
so-called Technical Union affair (Mlakar 1982: 157). In addition, his 
followers practiced violence, sometimes in a fascist-like manner. When, in 
October 1940, the Zbor members physically attacked the students of the 
Technical Faculty in Belgrade, the government finally outlawed the 
organization, which it had contemplated doing for some time (Gligorijević 
1963). This, however, did not put a stop to the activities of members and 
sympathizers of Zbor, who continued operating underground, some of them 
in an organization called Beli orli (White Eagles). They later re-emerged as 
collaborators with the Nazi occupiers of Yugoslavia.  
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Here the question logically arises as to what degree such 
phenomena and personalities influenced developments in occupied Slovenia 
during the Second World War? It is usually thought that the fascist 
movements—even though there were exceptions in Eastern Europe—were 
the ideological foundation and source of cadres for wartime collaboration. 
To a certain degree that was indeed the case in Slovenia. Considering the 
fact that the communists dominated the resistance movement’s leadership, 
anti-communism was the main motive for some members of the movements 
under consideration to turn against the resistance and collaborate with the 
occupiers. Such was the case of Straža v viharju (Sentinel in the Storm), 
whose members became the leaders of the so-called White Guard, as well as 
of extreme Yugoslav nationalists, who joined the ranks of the Chetniks. 
Later, in 1944, during the German occupation of the Ljubljana Province, 
this was especially true of the Slovene members of Zbor, who played a 
significant role in the regime of General Leon Rupnik. Some of them, with 
Izidor Cergol at the helm, became ideologists and propagandists of the 
Slovene Home Guard, at least outwardly supporting and praising Nazi 
Germany and its struggle for a so-called New Europe. However, the vast 
majority of the Home Guard members remained politically and 
ideologically loyal to the positions of the Catholic Slovene People’s Party 
(Mlakar 2003: 21–35, 398–414).  
 
Conclusions 
In Yugoslavia of the 1930s, as in other European countries, there 
were political attempts to respond to emerging totalitarian ideologies, such 
as fascism, Nazism, and communism. Liberal democracy was clearly in a 
serious crisis. Extremist movements, mostly with a right-wing orientation 
and some with obvious fascist characteristics, emerged throughout Europe, 
including in Yugoslavia and in Slovenia. However, these movements, with 
the possible exception of Zbor, could hardly be described as genuinely 
fascist.  
Problems arise when trying to define fascism and list its basic 
characteristics; scholars disagree on the definition (Goldberg 2007: 2–3). 
Ernst Nolte and Juan Linz have suggested basic criteria. Nolte emphasizes 
elements like anti-communism, anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism, party-
military relations, and the aims of totalitarianism. Linz focuses on ideology, 
goals, style, and organization of fascist movements or states. He lists the 
following: the establishment of a new nationalist authoritarian state, 
national trade unions and corporative economy, imperial expansion in 
relation to other nations, voluntarist “faith,” modernization and a new 
secular culture, external emphasis on rallies and the mobilization of the 
masses, organization of party militia, use of violence, enforcement of the 
male principle, praise of youth and the young, as well as tendencies to 
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follow a charismatic leader (Payne 1980: 14–21). Based on these 
descriptors, it seems accurate to describe King Alexandar and the Slovene 
People’s Party as “monarcho-fascist” or “clerical fascist.” 
The categorization of other movements reviewed in this article is 
questionable. The fact that some scholars even doubt the fascist character of 
the Croatian Ustaša movement, or describe it as pre-fascist or semi-fascist, 
shows how great a dilemma this is. Some have termed such cases “abortive 
fascisms” (Griffin 1995: 169–241; Vago 1976); another refers to “bogus, 
false fascisms” (Ambri 1980). In any case, the ideological and practical 
political elements linking these movements to fascism must be established. 
All of them were anti-capitalist and even more vehemently anti-communist; 
some were even anti-parliamentary. Although anti-Semitism was present in 
all of them, it was more a matter of principle and propaganda, with the 
exception of Zbor. The use of violence was justified and practiced only by 
ORJUNA and, to some extent, by Zbor. However, these political postures 
were not fully developed; nor did they culminate in serious threats to the 
existing social system and established political parties. Although the führer 
principle existed in Zbor, it proved more of a hindrance than a help to Ljotić 
in his political struggle. 
There are, though, two elements that were clearly present in all the 
movements—namely, radical nationalism and corporatism. However, 
problems arise here, too. Our review has shown that the movements in 
Slovenia also displayed an integral Yugoslav nationalism, which perceived 
Slovene individuality or even nationalism as a threat to the state and hence 
an ideological danger. This was one of the main reasons why these 
movements remained politically marginalized. After the Austro-Hungarian 
period ended, the Slovenes had only just begun the process of emancipation 
and political formation as a nation. It was unthinkable that they would 
renounce their nationality. For this reason there was no friction between the 
right-wing movements (or within them) that might have resulted in pan-
Yugoslav fascism vs. Slovene fascism. These movements all held that there 
was only one Yugoslav nation. Therefore, one cannot speak of Slovene 
fascism but only, perhaps, of (para)fascist movements (with Yugoslav 
pedigrees) in the Slovene territory.  
The Slovene People’s Party, which had consistently defended 
Slovene individuality and strove for its autonomy within the Yugoslav state, 
fully capitalized on this fact. On the other hand, a new extremist group, 
Straža v viharju, emerged within the Catholic camp in the 1930s. Apart 
from Catholic integralism based on the papal encyclicals, it also defended 
extreme Slovene nationalism and an independent Slovene state. In this 
sense, the movement was a singular exception. Although the group enjoyed 
support among the student population and Catholic intelligentsia (Miklavčič 
2001: 22–23; Žebot 1939), it remained without a wider following. Along 
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with all the other groups I have reviewed, it supported corporatism and the 
corporatist state system, for which it was associated with fascism. Given 
that, in the 1930s, the concept of corporatism was widely accepted in 
Slovenia and elsewhere, this cannot be used as a decisive criterion for 
categorizing a movement or political group as fascist. Even liberals strove 
for a certain type of corporatism. Those who opposed the corporative 
system were, naturally, communists and Marxists, who used this idea to 
designate their majority opponents as clerical fascists. This is how Edvard 
Kardelj, for example, branded Andrej Gosar, a Christian sociologist, who 
strove for some kind of “harmony between work and capital” (Kardelj 
1989: 276; Kostanjevec 1934). Ironically, Kardelj himself, as Yugoslavia’s 
chief communist ideologist, tried to implement a new type of corporatism 
after the Second World War, through socialist self-management.3 
With regards to the geo-strategic position of Slovenia in the 1930s, 
it should also be noted that its sizeable German minority became 
increasingly Nazified in the 1930s, and especially after the Anschluss of 
Austria. This provoked tensions among the Slovenes, who felt threatened by 
the Nazi campaign, and added to the problems of their political leadership, 
which had to exercise care in its relations with Nazi Germany (Vodopivec 
2006: 235–37; Biber 1966: 211–67; Cvirn 1998). Nazification was 
especially explicit in the minority umbrella organization Schwäbisch-
deutscher Kulturbund. The members of the minority were raised in the Nazi 
spirit. At the same time they were involved in intelligence operations for 
Nazi institutions in Austria. This involved not only military information, but 
also information about Slovene civilian institutions and the most prominent 
Slovenes. These activities were methodically carried out with a coming 
occupation in mind. The German minority supported the German invasion 
and occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941. It then for the most part 
cooperated with the Nazi occupation forces and actively supported 
Germanization and other forms of violence perpetrated against the Slovene 
population in the Lower Styria and Upper Carniola regions (Ferenc 1968: 
62–173). 
In summary, in the period between the two World Wars there was 
no real fascist movement in Slovenia, at least not one that displayed the 
main characteristics of fascism. There were political groups whose 
individual features resembled those of fascism, but they were not fascist in 
their essence. While displaying some fascist elements, these movements 
were nevertheless only a peripheral phenomenon in Yugoslav and Slovene 
societies at the time.  
Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino 
                                            
3  At least, that is how Igor Lukšič describes self-management, although he is not 
the only one to do so (1992). 
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POVZETEK 
 
RADIKALNI NACIONALIZEM TER ELEMENTI FAŠIZMA V 
GIBANJIH NA SLOVENSKEM V OBDOBJU MED OBEMA 
VOJNAMA 
Avtor v uvodu poudarja dejstvo, da se sodobno zgodovinopisje le redko 
dotika pojava fašizma na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, če pa že, pa se njegova 
obravnava ponavadi konča pri hrvaškem ustaštvu. Še toliko bolj je v 
literaturi v tem pogledu spregledana Slovenija in s tem tamkajšnji politični 
pojavi, ki jih pred drugo svetovno vojno na tak ali drugačen način lahko 
povezujemo s fašizmom. Ob tem je uvodoma predstavljen položaj 
slovenskega naroda po prvi svetovni vojni, ki ga je pomembno zaznamovalo 
dejstvo, da je bil razdeljen med več držav, pri čemer pa tudi v matični 
Jugoslaviji večina prebivalstva, ki je sicer sledila katoliški Slovenski ljudski 
stranki, sploh ni bila zadovoljna s svojim položajem. 
Sledi podrobnejša obravnava posameznih političnih gibanj. 
Začetna omemba Narodne socialistične stranke je predvsem zanimivost, saj 
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je po svojem imenu že med sodobniki vzbujala asociacije na nacistično 
stranko v Nemčiji, predvsem pa tu izstopa morbidno dejstvo, da se je eden 
od voditeljev stranke leta 1921osebno srečal s Hitlerjem, sicer pa med 
njunima strankam ni bilo nobenih stičnih točk. Osrednji del razprave je 
nato posvečen pojavu in delovanju Orjune, to je Organizaciji 
jugoslovanskih nacionalistov. Le-ta je nastala v Dalmaciji in se razširila 
tudi v Sloveniji, imela pa je, zanimivo, močan protiitalijanski oziroma 
protifašistični naboj. Je pa po svojih metodah, predvsem z uporabo 
fizičnega nasilja spominjala na fašizem in tako so jo ocenjevali sodobniki. 
Po nekaterih nasilnih akcijah je bila Orjuna v Sloveniji kmalu razpuščena, 
drugod po Jugoslaviji pa razorožena. V istem razdobju, to je v prvi polovici 
20. let, so tudi italijanske fašistične oblasti na priključenem Primorskem 
skušale organizirati slovensko fašistično stranko, a brez vidnega uspeha. 
Diktatura kralja Aleksandra in zatem njegova nasilna smrt ter 
spreminjajoči se evropski kontekst so tudi v tem pogledu v Jugoslaviji in 
Sloveniji privedli do novih pojavov, in sicer v obliki raznih nacionalističnih 
gibanj, ki so se večkrat oblikovala okrog svojih glasil ali pa okrog močne 
osebnosti. Takšna gibanja so bila npr. Združenje borcev Jugoslavije – Boj, 
Borba in Pohod, ki so se povezovala s širšimi sorodnimi organizacijami 
drugod po Jugoslaviji. Drugačna je bila pot Jugoslovanskega ljudskega 
gibanja Zbor, ki se je iz Srbije razširilo drugam, med drugim je našlo kar 
močan odmev tudi v Sloveniji. Ustanovil in do svoje smrti ga je vodil srbski 
politik Dimitrije Ljotić. V Sloveniji je Zbor imel kar nekaj pristašev med 
intelektualci in študenti. Za razliko od ostalih gibanj, se je preizkusil tudi na 
volitvah, vendar je leta 1935 dobil v Dravski banovini 2503 glasove, leta 
1938 pa le še 1132, kar pa je bilo seveda daleč premalo za dosego 
poslanskega mandata. Za Zbor je bil značilen izrazit antisemitizem in je 
izražal poudarjen odpor do demokracije. Pristaši Zbora so med drugo 
svetovno vojno v veliki meri kolaborirali z nacističnim okupatorjem. 
Vsa omenjena gibanja so ostala obrobnega značaja in niso mogla 
upati na važnejšo vlogo v političnem življenju, kaj šele, da bi lahko mislila 
na prevzem oblasti. Poglavitni vzrok je bil v tem, da so sicer bila skrajno 
nacionalistična, vendar ne v slovenskem, temveč v jugoslovanskem smislu. 
Zastopala so stališče o samo enem in enotnem jugoslovanskem narodu in 
bila proti vsakršnemu separatizmu, ki so ga razumela zelo na široko. 
Socialna in kulturno-politična baza za takšna stališča pa je bila na 
Slovenskem zelo omejena. S fašizmom jih je sicer povezovalo zavzemanje za 
uporabo fizične sile, protikapitalistična in protikomunistična naravnanost, 
propagiranje korporativne ureditve družbe in države, deloma tudi 
antisemitizem in antiparlamentarizem. V seštevku gre torej za sicer mučno, 
a vendarle prehodno in malo pomembno etapo v razvoju slovenskega 
političnega življenja. 
